The Exciting Conflict: The Rhetoric of Pornography and Anti-pornography by Elmer, Jonathan
 The Exciting Conflict:
 The Rhetoric of Pornography and Anti-Pornography
 Jonathan Elmer
 ornography is, once again, something of a hot item. The legal battles
 recently fought in Minneapolis, Indianapolis, and elsewhere have re-
 newed interest in the issue, even a sense of pressing urgency. A presi-
 dential commission, with Attorney General Meese's blessing, contin-
 ues to sound the alarm. For a while, The Village Voice seemed to have
 appointed itself propagandist for the anti-censorship crusade, while
 such national publications as The New Republic, Harper's, and Newsweek
 have offered cover articles in the past few years that take a less definite
 stance.' Debates over pornography-and, more generally, female
 sexuality-are as heated as ever in feminist circles, academic and oth-
 erwise. And the public's fascination was aroused, in the summer of
 1984, by the story of Vanessa Williams's fall from beauty-queen grace:
 1. Lisa Duggan, "Censorship in the Name of Feminism"; Richard Goldstein, "Por-
 nography and its Discontents"; Nat Hentoff, "Is the First Amendment Dangerous to
 Women?" Village Voice, 16 October 1984; Susan Brownmiller et al., "The Place of Por-
 nography: Packaging Eros for a Violent Age," Harper's, November 1984; Jean Bethke
 Elshtain, "Women, Politics and Pornography," The New Republic, 25 June 1984; Aric
 Press with Tessa Namuth et al., "The War Against Pornography: Feminists, Free
 Speech and the Law," Newsweek, 18 March 1985.
 ? 1988 by Cultural Critique. 0882-4371 (Winter 1987-88). All rights reserved.
 45
This content downloaded from 129.79.32.58 on Mon, 27 Jan 2020 20:54:39 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 46 Jonathan Elmer
 with the publication of pictures of a naked Williams in the September
 1984 issue of Penthouse (pictures which pre-dated her ascension to the
 throne), the Miss America Pageant officials felt compelled to protect
 the good name of their venerable institution by stripping Williams of
 her title.
 Long after the Pageant officials had airbrushed Williams out of the
 glorious Pageant history, casual conversation was still deciding who
 was more reprehensible: the Pageant officials, for adhering to hypocrit-
 ical standards of decency and thereby increasing Williams's public hu-
 miliation, or Penthouse publisher Bob Guccione, for willfully creating
 the scandal and Williams's humiliation in order to make a fast million.
 In the end, only Williams lost out. The Pageant officials got a chance to
 reaffirm their sense of decency, to show where they draw the line;
 Guccione got a chance to challenge that standard of decency; and the
 public got something titillating to talk about and to look at-the Sep-
 tember 1984 issue of Penthouse sold more copies than any previous
 installment in the magazine's fifteen-year existence. In short, for the
 pornography controversy, as for the pornography industry, business is
 booming.
 This essay is about the rhetoric of pornography and anti-pornography,
 about the pornography controversy, but not about pornographyper se.
 It makes no sense to speak of pornography as something that simply
 exists outside of a constituting discourse. Pornography is, rather, the
 designation of certain forms of sexual representation as beyond the
 pale; it is the persistent limit-case of acceptable discourse. "Pornogra-
 phy," in other words, is a term used by moral discourse to structure it-
 self: wherever pornography is found to be, there the line will be drawn
 (provisionally) to exclude it. Vanessa Williams's story illustrates this
 well. Pornographyper se was manifestly not the issue, but rather "por-
 nography" was a triggering concept that allowed the Pageant officials
 to draw the line one place, Penthouse another, and the public according
 to its personal tastes. It is no accident that questions of punishment-
 legal action against the officials and Guccione, whether Williams "got
 what she deserved"-arose in connection with this frenzy of line-draw-
 ing between acceptable and unacceptable behavior.
 Williams's story is exemplary in another way as well, for it is not her
 story at all; it is, to revive the feminist pun, "his-story" quite com-
 pletely. Guccione published the photographs without Williams's knowl-
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 edge, after which the Pageant officials threatened her with action if she
 did not willingly resign, which she did. Guccione stripped Williams
 against her will, whereupon the Pageant officials, in an act of phallic
 one-up-manship, forced Williams to "strip" herself (of her tide, yes,
 but we get the point). The pornographic condition of women, where the
 choices are outright coercion or enforced submission, is reaffirmed.
 There are, then, two pornographies: the industry and the discursive
 term. As a practice and industry largely controlled by male interests
 and capital, pornography exploits women materially, requiring them, in
 their role as "sexual workers," to sell themselves-their bodies-as com-
 modity objects. A materialist critique of the pornography industry, and
 there have been some powerful ones, would try to position the commod-
 ification of female sexuality in relation to the larger patterns of an
 ever-expanding exchange economy, perhaps stressing with Engels and
 others the role of women as the original exchange objects, perhaps see-
 ing the massive diffusion of pornographic production as part of the ex-
 pansion of mechanisms of commodification into ever more "private"
 realms like sexuality.2 I will not be offering such a critique, however,
 since my interest is in the ways in which arguments for and against por-
 nography have tended to maintain a conflict already present in pornog-
 raphy itself, a conflict which is in itself satisfying: hence my focus on
 verbal structures and vocabularies, and the merely glancing treatment
 of the visual iconography of pornographic productions themselves. In
 other words, I will examine how the discursive structures to be found
 in the pornography controversy work to reinforce and maintain the
 pornography industry. The story of Vanessa Williams shows the mutual
 2. See, for example, Frederick Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the
 State (New York: International Publishers, 1942) as well as what remains, in my view,
 the most compelling revision and expansion of Engels's (and Levi-Strauss's) specula-
 tions on the exchange of women, Gayle Rubin, "The Traffic in Women: Notes on the
 'Political Economy' of Sex," in Toward an Anthropology of Women, ed. Rayna R. Reiter
 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 157-210. For a sophisticated treatment of the
 questions of the compatibility between feminism and Marxism that would arise in the
 materialist critique of pornography I have merely sketched above, see Catherine A.
 MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory," in
 Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology, ed. Nannerl O. Keohane, Michelle Z. Rosaldo, and
 Barbara C. Gelpi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 1-30. MacKinnon's ar-
 ticle also contains a scrupulously complete bibliography (in the form of footnotes) of
 feminist/Marxist criticism. A more recent attempt at a Marxist analysis of pornogra-
 phy, in a slightly apologetic vein, can be found in Alan Soble, Pornography: Marxism,
 Feminism, and the Future of Sexuality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).
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 reinforcement of these two pornographies. This reinforcement, I will
 argue, is effected not so much by the diffusion of actual pornographic
 representations of women throughout the societal psyche, as by the
 replication of pornography's mode of representation. The connection be-
 tween pornography and the pornography controversy, between por-
 nography as something to look at and pornography as something to
 talk about and worry over, is a connection of discursive form rather
 than representational content.
 This form is a kind of discursive agon which, in order to maintain it-
 self (and, indeed, to reproduce itself elsewhere), depends upon a rule
 of exclusion. Samuel Weber has noted that the "gesture of exclusion" in
 certain philosophical discourses "emerges as a necessary move de-
 signed to save the agonistic process from its own tendencies towards
 entropy."3 This rule of exclusion, whatever its importance in philo-
 sophical discourse (some would say it is constitutive of Western meta-
 physics since Plato), is manifestly operative in the less exalted dis-
 courses of pornography and the pornography controversy. Pornogra-
 phy is a representational practice in which women, for all the graphic
 display of their body parts, are the excluded term. Similarly, por-
 nography, in its guise as a self-structuring term of legal and moral dis-
 course, is itself something of a principle of exclusion which, by continu-
 ally questioning the boundaries of acceptable discourse, continually al-
 lows discourse to declare itself acceptable. What is remarkable about the
 discourse of and around pornography is the way in which what is ex-
 cluded is simultaneously what is most desperately and obsessively rep-
 resented: indeed, when more specialized vocabularies (I will be look-
 ing at legal thought, cultural critique, and psychoanalysis) turn their at-
 tention to the socio-sexual "problem" of pornography, the terms most
 critical to their arguments are exactly those which both conceal and
 display what is excluded, the hole in the theory. At all points, feminist
 revision of these specialized discourses will be necessary-that is, the
 introduction of a perspective which starts from the differential quality
 and descriptive effects these vocabularies have for men and women. I
 hope to show that pornography is necessarily a feminist concern, but
 not exclusively so. Exclusion, after all, is itself the issue.
 3. Samuel Weber, "Texts/Contexts: Closure and Exclusion," Diacritics 10, no. 2
 (Summer 1980): 37.
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 1. Legalizing Morality
 In 1957, the Supreme Court set a standard of obscenity that has
 proved remarkably ineffective in curbing the production, distribution,
 or consumption of sexually explicit material. At that time, the Court
 decided that a work was deemed obscene if "to the average person, ap-
 plying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of
 the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests."4 In the
 same decision the Court stated that "implicit in the history of the First
 Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming
 social importance." My interest here is less the legal viability of such a
 standard5 than its appeal to a set of pseudo-philosophical categories
 such as the "average person," "community standards," "prurient in-
 terests," and "social importance." A legal definition of obscenity
 would presumably try to define precisely what constitutes "prurient in-
 terests" and how these interests are to be distinguished from others of
 "social importance"; the standard of the Court, however, merely
 reasserts that there is a distinction, the felt need for which is surely the
 motivation behind any attempt to curb obscenity through legal action.
 The emphasis of the standard is on the categories of "social impor-
 tance" that are ostensibly threatened by obscenity, namely the "com-
 munity" and the "average person," and not at all on the nature of
 "prurient interests" which, in contrast to the assumed solidarity of the
 "average person" residing in a "community" with "standards," seem
 to exist in a contextual vacuum: obscene material would seem to ap-
 peal to "prurient interests" unattached to prurient people. Whatever
 the goal of the Court's definition, the force of its language suggests the
 shoring up of certain existential boundaries, of the "community" and
 of the self (that "average person"), beyond which floats the noxious
 cloud of "prurient interests." Rather than defining obscenity, the
 Court's standard simply reasserts the possibility of defining obscenity, a
 possibility assured by the assumed coherence of a community and a
 self able to judge.
 4. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
 5. For a legal critique, see Earl Warren, "Obscenity Laws-A Shift to Reality," in The
 Pornography Controversy, ed. Ray C. Rist (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1975),
 96-116. For an informal history of earlier obscenity laws in England and America, see
 H. Montgomery Hyde, A History of Pornography (London: Heinemann, 1964).
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 Discouraged by the ineffectiveness of the standard, the Court, in sub-
 sequent decisions, moved away from the purely abstract definition
 and paid closer attention to the context surrounding the offensive
 action itself. Thus, in a decision of 1966, Ginzburg v. United States,6 the
 Court found Ginzburg guilty on postal charges of obscenity. The issue
 was less whether his publications were themselves obscene than whether
 they were rendered obscene by being pandered in a commercial man-
 ner.7 The Court attempted to discern Ginzburg's obscene intent, which
 they did by noting that he had asked for mailing privileges in two Penn-
 sylvania towns with the suggestive names of Intercourse and Blue Ball.
 The Court located Ginzburg's obscene intent in Ginzburg's own loca-
 tion of his obscene operation within Middle America. Whether the stan-
 dard of 1957 was invoked or not, the Court reasserted the inviolability
 of the boundaries of the abstract "community." Ginzburg had eventually
 received mailing rights in Middlesex, New Jersey, but the Court could
 not tolerate an apparent infiltration of sex within the "community"-
 Ginzburg's attempt to turn Middle America into Middlesex, America.
 The Court's categories of "community standards" and the "average
 person" have, in fact, proved as tenacious as pornographers' ingenuity
 in escaping obscenity restrictions. In 1970, the Commission on Ob-
 scenity and Pornography, a research group set up by President John-
 son in 1967 in response to apparent public concern over the issue,
 published its findings. They discovered no evidence that exposure to
 pornography led to an increase in anti-social behavior, and recom-
 mended the appeal of most existing legislation restricting sexually ex-
 plicit material.8 The Nixon administration immediately dissociated it-
 self from the report, and the Court, soon afterwards, made explicit its
 disregard for what might pass as empirical evidence. Chief Justice
 Warren Burger wrote in 1973: "Although there is no conclusive proof
 between antisocial behavior and obscene materials, the legislature of
 Georgia could quite reasonably assume that such a connection does or
 might exist."9 In other words, the legislature of Georgia can assume
 6. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
 7. The facts of the case can be found in Warren, "Obscenity Laws," and in John H.
 Gagnon and William Simon, "Pornography-Raging Menace or Paper Tiger?" in The
 Pornography Controversy, 85-95.
 8. For details, see Ray C. Rist, "Pornography as a Social Problem," in The Pornography
 Controversy, 1-15.
 9. Cited in Rist, Ibid., 7.
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 "community standards," and can act to protect those standards from
 the nefarious influence of obscene materials; the nefarious influence
 can itself be assumed. Whether or not the Court or the legislature of
 Georgia should have the power to disregard the absence of "con-
 clusive proof' is not my concern. What is important is the open ex-
 pression of the Court's role as not simply limiting, but constructing as
 well. This assertive power of the Court lies less in the creation of a defi-
 nition of obscenity than in the reiterated assumption of categories of
 being, the unitary self and the united body politic. The invocation of
 these categories is also in part their creation, and this invocation allows
 the Court to state, repeatedly, little more than that there is a conflict
 between two separable entities, "prurient interests" and "community
 standards." But if "prurient interests" do not exist outside of context,
 if in fact they reside within the "community" or even within the "aver-
 age person," attempts to limit those interests by assuming their exte-
 riority will necessarily fail. The massive pornography industry is evi-
 dence that such attempts have failed. And yet the conflict continues,
 for it is the very representation of conflict that is reassuring to the self
 and to society, reassuring precisely because such a representation as-
 sumes that the self and society can stand solid and unitary against their
 own internal divisions.
 The most crucial societal division glossed over in the Supreme
 Court's treatment of obscenity is that of gender. The dialectic de-
 scribed above, in which abstract definitions of obscenity, by their very
 unenforcability, allow for more production of pornography, which in
 turn provides more opportunities for the Court to assert the existence
 of an undivided self and polity, is a male dialectic, self-enclosed and
 self-regenerating. Almost without exception, the courts are male, the
 pornographers are male, and the prurient interests (the consumers of
 pornography) are male. The "average person" and the "community"
 which the Court assumes, and which are in fact self-divided by "pruri-
 ent interests," are male. In other words, the Court handles pornogra-
 phy (their word is "obscenity") as a discursive term without specific
 implications for gender relations. They do not, at base, consider por-
 nography as a practice with effects and significations that are gender-
 specific.
 In 1983, Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin presented to
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 the City Council of Minneapolis a legislative ordinance that considers
 pornography precisely as a practice, a discriminatory one. In the words
 of the ordinance: "The Council finds that pornography is central in
 creating and maintaining the civil inequality of the sexes."10 Abstract
 notions of obscenity become irrelevant when pornography is thus con-
 ceived as a discriminatory practice which constitutes an infringement
 of the civil rights of women. The ordinance passed the City Council
 but was vetoed (twice) by the mayor of Minneapolis. In 1984, another
 version of the ordinance was passed by the mayor of Indianapolis,
 only to be struck down by the courts in November of that year as
 unconstitutional." Many other cities have found the re-interpretation
 of pornography offered by MacKinnon and Dworkin very appealing as
 a possible means of legal action.
 The ordinance correctly understands that a public representation is
 not politically or ideologically innocent, but itself constitutes an act.
 The difficulty, however, lies in negotiating the connection between the
 content of the representation and the action that is the public display
 of that representation. An image of violence against women, displayed
 publicly, does constitute a form of violence against women, but not the
 same violence as that depicted in the image. The difference between
 the two is precisely what is elided by the language of the "Special Find-
 ings" section of the ordinance: "Pornography is a systematic practice
 of exploitation and subordination based on sex which differentially
 harms women. The bigotry and contempt it promotes, with the acts of
 aggression it fosters, harm women's opportunities for equality of rights
 . . ."(Appendix II, 206). In the first sentence, "practice" could well re-
 fer to the interior workings of the pornography industry itself, in which
 women (those who work as models, actresses, etc.) are systematically
 exploited by, and subordinate to, the male producers and entrepre-
 neurs in control of the industry. As the second sentence makes clear,
 however, "practice" in fact refers to the dissemination of pornography,
 its impact on the public: pornography, as the representation of ex-
 ploited and subordinated women, reproduces itself in the public sphere,
 promoting bigotry and fostering violence. What happens to women
 10. Excerpts from the Minneapolis ordinance can be found as "Appendix II" in Wom-
 en Against Censorship, ed. Varda Burstyn (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1985), 206-8.
 11. For details of the Indianapolis story, see Lisa Duggan, "Censorship in the Name
 of Feminism."
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 within the pornography industry happens to all women outside. The
 medium for this exchange of exploitation, bigotry, contempt, and ag-
 gression is, precisely, the public representation of it.
 The issue, then, is the relation between discourses, specifically the
 relation between the specialized discourse of the pornography indus-
 try (which uses a limited set of iconographic images and textual tech-
 niques to represent the "sexually explicit subordination of women"
 [Appendix II, 206]) and the general discourse of society (which also
 subordinates women, but in many spheres other than the sexual, and
 with different, often more insidious techniques). The Minneapolis or-
 dinance conceives this relation causally: "Pornography is central in cre-
 ating and maintaining the civil inequality of the sexes" (my emphasis).
 Pornography is, therefore, the temporally and logically prior locus of
 the oppression of women from which emanate the manifestations of
 sex discrimination in all spheres of civil society; the manner in which
 pornographic representation transmits sexist ideology is not consid-
 ered problematic.12
 Pornography is central, for MacKinnon and Dworkin, because sex-
 uality is central. The societal subordination of women is dependent
 upon, and grows out of, the sexual subordination of women. Hence
 pornography, as the purest expression of that sexual subordination, is
 responsible for "creating," at the societal level, the economic, legal,
 and intellectual oppression of women. But if pornography represents
 female sexuality as victimization, what notion of female sexuality do
 MacKinnon and Dworkin entertain? Obviously, an ordinance against
 pornography is not the vehicle for an elaboration of the nature of fe-
 male sexuality. Nevertheless, as Carole Vance has noted,'3 the ordi-
 nance, in the name of protecting women against the all-too-common
 attacks of complicity (an attack consistently made in rape trials), alto-
 gether discounts the very notion of female sexual consent.
 12. The ordinance does consider pornographic imagery in some detail, but here,
 too, there is slippage between discursive spheres. Words that connote women's experi-
 ence in (sexist) society, such as "subordination," "humiliation," and "inferior," are
 nestled in with words which properly describe pornographic violence. That this slip-
 page is part of the relation between pornography and society is doubtless true, but it is
 important to understand the nature of this slippage, not simply take the terminological
 confusion for granted.
 13. See Lisa Duggan, Nan Hunter, and Carole S. Vance, "False Promises: Antipor-
 nography Legislation in the U.S.," in Women Against Censorship, 130-51.
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 Section M of the Minneapolis ordinance reads: "Any person, includ-
 ing transsexual, who is coerced, intimidated, or fraudulently induced ...
 into performing for pornography, shall have a cause of action .. ."
 (Appendix II, 207). There follows a list of "facts or conditions" which
 "shall not, without more, negate a finding of coercion." These include
 conditions used regularly by rape lawyers to impute complicity on the
 part of the victim: that the victim is a woman (aa), a prostitute (bb), of
 the age of majority (cc), or is related to the defendant (dd). Other con-
 ditions, however, which shall not "negate a finding of coercion" in fact
 negate the notion of consent: "that the person actually consented to a
 use of the performance that is changed into pornography" (hh); "that
 the person showed no resistance or appeared to co-operate actively"
 (jj); "that the person signed a contract, or made statements affirming a
 willingness to co-operate in the production of pornography" (kk); that
 no force was used, or that the person was paid (11, mm)(Appendix II,
 207-8). In repudiating the validity of consent, these conditions assert
 that pornography simply is coercion.
 In this respect, the Minneapolis ordinance takes the extreme ex-
 pressions of pornography, in which women are pictured bound, tor-
 tured, or raped, at their word: women's relation to male sexuality is, as
 Hustler would have it, one of utter victimization. Any expression of fe-
 male consent (from a porn star, for example, who claims to enjoy her
 profession) is discounted as meaningless, at least in terms of defense.
 Whether stigmatized by society as morally depraved, or discounted by
 the Minneapolis ordinance as victimized and hence without any mean-
 ingful language of consent, the female sexual worker (model, porn ac-
 tress, prostitute) receives the same treatment: enforced silence and
 marginalization. Moreover, because the ordinance understands por-
 nography as the source of the (successfully) coercive ideology of sexism,
 women who do not work in sex industries, and yet who have ambiva-
 lent or even positive relationships to the dominant sexual arrange-
 ments, are similarly suspect: the greater your involvement, the more
 complete your coercion, the less you can know what you want.
 The Supreme Court's efforts to curb pornography failed because it
 refused to recognize the self-divided nature of the (male) public it was
 trying to protect: the Court failed to understand that "prurient interests"
 could not be placed in an exterior position to the "community" and the
 "average person" simply by legislative fiat. As we have seen, however,
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 there is a psychological payoff in this very failure. The Minneapolis or-
 dinance repeats the failure for a female public: by discounting any no-
 tion of female consent to pornography and hence to general sexual ar-
 rangements, the ordinance ignores the self-divided nature of female
 sexuality in favor of a purer vision of gender-defined conflict. Unfor-
 tunately, the psychological payoff is not commensurate for women.
 For, while male assertions of a unitary self do not prohibit continued
 expressions of male sexuality (witness the huge pornography industry),
 the denial of female sexual ambivalence, of even partial consent to pres-
 ent sexual arrangements, merely continues the silencing of female sexual
 expression that society already enforces.14
 The Supreme Court understood pornography as lying at the fringes
 of society; the Minneapolis ordinance understands it as lying at the
 heart of society, "central." The Supreme Court considered pornogra-
 phy abstractly, as a discursive term ("obscenity") that stood in opposi-
 tion to a male self and polity; it did not consider the way in which por-
 nography is also a practice. The Minneapolis ordinance considers por-
 nography purely as practice, and then proceeds to conflate that prac-
 tice with discourse itself. Both legal approaches place men at the center
 (either the unitary male untainted with "prurient interests," or the ra-
 pacious pornographer emanating sexist ideology); both approaches
 marginalize women (either by ignoring them, or by portraying them as
 pure victims, coerced by discourse itself). Perhaps the two conceptions
 can be pictured as follows:
 The Circle of Male Discourse
 Prurient Interests Women Coerced Out of Discourse
 er Person Sexist Society
 and ir i
 ?-- Om
 The Court The Minneapolis Ordinance
 14. Some feminists have long been calling for the diversion of attention away from
 male abuses, understood as crippling of an authentic female sexuality, and onto the af-
 firmation and construction of a genuine female sexual expression. For an anthology
 that makes this appeal, see Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality, ed. Carole
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 The Supreme Court, ignoring pornography's differential effect on
 women, effectively relegates them to the fringes of male discourse, as
 speechless as the dirty pictures of the "prurient interests." MacKinnon
 and Dworkin, radically discounting the notion of female consent while
 simultaneously conflating the coercive discourse of pornography with
 the general discourse of society, also relegate women to a position at
 the fringe, powerless to assert a female sexuality, as speechless as ob-
 scene photographs.
 The Supreme Court and the Minneapolis ordinance locate pornog-
 raphy differently, as fringe or as center, and yet the structure remains
 the same: a circle of male discourse exclusive of women. Perhaps at-
 tempts to legislate pornography necessarily reproduce this rule of ex-
 clusion; perhaps attempts to legalize morality necessarily obscure and
 conflate the intricate relations between sexuality, representation, and
 discourse as these relations play themselves out differently for men and
 women. Is this the lesson to be learned from the apparent appropriation
 of the feminist anti-pornography movement by the New Right?15
 "I know it when I see it," said Justice Stewart. The question remains
 whether we can know it before we can see it. I will now turn to other at-
 tempts to see it, attempts not bound by the peculiarly intransigent
 rhetoric of the law. Perhaps speaking about pornography differently
 changes what it looks like.
 2. The Culture of Pornography
 I am a pornographer. My magazines are raunchier, more disgust-
 ing, more lewd, licentious and vile than anything on the market.
 They don't need to have any social redeeming importance other
 than what they have: to illustrate graphically that our nation is
 hung up on sex, a natural function of healthy primates that has
 been suppressed because of religion.
 -Larry Flynt, Propaganda flyer
 Pornographers generally consider themselves champions of free-
 dom of speech, and as such tend to ally themselves with the political
 Vance (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), especially the essays by Vance,
 Gayle Rubin, Alice Echols, and Paula Webster.
 15. See Duggan, "Censorship in the Name of Feminism."
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 left.16 Larry Flynt certainly does: he was the defendant in a $45 million
 libel suit lodged by the Great Right Hope himself, the Reverend Jerry
 Falwell. The flyer from which the above passage is taken reads like a
 catalogue of leftist rhetoric. Flynt's argument hinges on the hypocrisy
 of the notion of permissible and impermissible freedoms of speech.
 Those whose expression was considered impermissible are the heroes
 of progressives: Dred Scott, Susan B. Anthony, Margaret Sanger, the
 NAACP, Dennis Banks, Thomas Paine; those whose expressions were
 permissible are villains: the Ku Klux Klan, Attorney General Palmer,
 Comstock, McCarthy, "Father" Terminiello. One need not be a liber-
 tarian to find Flynt's list compelling.
 Is Flynt's leftist rhetoric merely a smoke-screen, what Lewis Lapham
 calls the "pretense to political statement,"17 or is there a genuine rela-
 tion between pornography as a practice and the rhetoric of its
 apologists? In the passage cited above, Flynt seems to feel that pornog-
 raphy's existence is its own apology: the social importance of his
 magazines simply is that they "illustrate that our nation is hung up on
 sex." The word "illustrate" has a curious double meaning here. It
 could refer to the images in Flynt's magazines, in which case it seems
 fair to say that it is Flynt's enterprise that is "hung up on sex." On the
 other hand, Flynt must also conceive of his enterprise as already
 ensconced in its public role. In this sense, the existence of Hustler
 "illustrates" that "our nation is hung up on sex" in two ways: by its
 sales, which indicate an audience, and by the virulent opposition it
 arouses, which indicates another audience "hung up on sex." Flynt's
 enterprise, then, is both fringe and mainstream: its libertarian polemic
 is both sustained and justified by its secure position in the mainstream
 market economy. Al Goldstein, publisher of Screw magazine, agrees
 with Flynt: pornography "serves as a visual polemic that encourages
 people to feel more open about their sexuality. In the pages of Screw,
 and in pornography in general, a philosophic argument is being set
 out that is intended to liberate people sexually."'8 Screw is a weekly tab-
 loid that eschews mainstream pornographic iconography in favor of
 sexual and political (leftist, of course) polemic. The polemic comprises
 16. For histories of various pornographers and their political affiliations in former
 times, see Hyde, A History of Pornography.
 17. In "The Place of Pornography," Harper's, November 1984.
 18. Ibid.
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 half the normal issue; the other half is purely economic-pictorial ad-
 vertisements for paraphernalia, literature, and prostitutes-male, fe-
 male, and transsexual.
 For Goldstein and Flynt, the "visual polemic" of pornography is
 inextricably linked to economics: they champion the right to sell sexu-
 ality as everything else is sold in our society. Hugh Hefner, the daddy
 of American pornographers, understood this well. From its opening
 issue, Playboy could afford to mute its polemic because it presented it-
 self as already ensconced in the secure economic sphere of the upper
 class:
 Most of today's "magazines for men" spend all their time out-of-
 doors-thrashing through thorny thickets or splashing about in
 fast-flowing streams. We'll be out there too, occasionally, but we
 don't mind telling you in advance- we plan on spending most of
 our time inside. We like our apartment. We enjoy mixing up cock-
 tails and an hors d'oeuvre or two, putting a little mood music on
 the phonograph, and inviting a female acquaintance for a quiet
 discussion on Picasso, Nietzsche, jazz, sex.19
 Playboy's polemic is surely mild: no ranting about America's sexual
 hangups, just a polite jab at other "men's magazines." Sex seems pe-
 ripheral to the main goal, the enjoyment of the good life. Indeed, sex
 is just another aspect of high culture, side by side with Picasso and Nie-
 tzsche. Let Flynt and Goldstein "thrash through the thorny thickets"
 of the world of hard-core pornography, we can join Hef in his cozy
 apartment, or rather his numerous mansions.
 Evidently, pornography makes good business sense. The pornogra-
 phy industry is well entrenched in the market economy. Why, then, do
 renegade pornographers like Flynt and Goldstein consistently make
 trouble? Why don't they learn from business moguls like Hefner and
 Guccione and clean up their product in search of ever larger profits?
 By consistently challenging the limits to acceptable speech, hard-
 core pornographers get a sense of mission while still making good
 money. This mission can seem political, as with Flynt's list of history's
 heroes who challenged the past limits of expression, or it can seem
 19. Quoted in Peter Michelson, "The Pleasures of Commodity, or How to Make the
 World Safe for Pornography," in The Pornography Controversy, 143, 145.
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 religious, as when Flynt sets his message of sexual liberation in oppo-
 sition to "religion," which has "suppressed" the "natural function of
 healthy primates."20 This campaign against religion, however, poses
 no real threat since it is completely contained within a self-generating
 dialectic of morality. Pornography, in its political and religious guises,
 is once again nothing more than a discursive term which, as the appar-
 ently opposite face of morality, assures the continued existence of an
 overarching moral discourse. Moral indignation which expresses itself
 as legislation will fail precisely because it is in its interest to do so. The
 Supreme Court and the "immoral" pornographers need each other:
 by constantly rehearsing the conflict, each assures the other of contin-
 ued existence. They are mirror images which reflect and perpetuate
 the systematic moral discourse which contains them. Both Jerry Falwell
 and Larry Flynt are, after all, "born again."
 The political and/or religious mission of pornography is a ruse: it is
 the very sense of mission which affords the psychological payoff. In
 considering the Supreme Court's stand regarding obscenity, I sug-
 gested that the consistent appeal to categories of being like the "aver-
 age person" was a shoring up of existential boundaries that was in it-
 self gratifying. In turning now to the Court's other half, those cham-
 pions of free speech and sexual liberation, we can find, in their more
 colorful rhetoric, the specifically erotic component in this psychologi-
 cal gratification.
 In 1968, Charles Rembar, the lawyer who defended Fanny Hill, Tropic
 of Cancer, and Lady Chatterly's Lover against obscenity charges, published
 a book about the trials entitled The End of Obscenity.21 Norman Mailer,
 Rembar's cousin, wrote the introduction. In a few overexerted pages,
 Mailer manages to draw together the various strands that compose the
 psychic economy of those rebels that challenge the limits on free
 speech. The prevailing mood is martial. Mailer speaks of the "legal
 revolution led by a few determined and extraordinary publishers,"
 who remind him of certain "Civil War Generals" (v). From there,
 Mailer waxes nostalgic for his youth, when Cy Rembar, eight years his
 20. This anti-religious campaign of de-mystification has a long and respected tradi-
 tion, dating back at least to Sade's famous harangue, "Yet another Effort, Frenchmen,
 if you would become Republicans," in Philosophy in the Bedroom (New York: Grove Press,
 1965).
 21. Charles Rembar, The End of Obscenity (New York: Bantam, 1968).
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 senior, served as something of an older brother to him. Rembar was,
 according to Mailer, extraordinarily good with the bat, regularly hitting
 late-inning homers. Rembar's baseball prowess is intimately connec-
 ted with his abilities as a lawyer in Mailer's mind, and both are sub-
 sumed in a sexual economy: even today, Mailer cries, Rembar "looks
 for moral issues in his activities. And still plays baseball. And still
 might take a girl away from me if he chose to" (vii). For Mailer, if
 you're good with the bat, you're good with the girls, and you're good
 with "moral issues" like challenging obscenity laws. The focus grows
 sharper: Mailer tells us that Rembar's "particular ability ... to reason
 has become a force which approaches the power of a mighty muscle"
 (vii). And in a final phallic salute, Mailer welcomes Rembar into the
 elite circle of writers and thinkers at the cutting edge of penetrating
 moral insight: "Welcome to my racket, Cousin Cy, Gentleman Sword"
 (ix). The nexus of power, force, and reason, so dear to the mind com-
 mitted to phallic mastery, could not be clearer; nor could the imaged
 weapon, whether it be baseball bat, sword, or even the "mighty mus-
 cle" itself.
 It is not surprising that the rhetoric in the controversy over por-
 nography should be riddled with sexual anxiety or, as with Mailer,
 phallic crowing. What is surprising is that it would ever be considered
 as anything other than a sexual dilemma. The obfuscations of the Su-
 preme Court are perhaps indicative of male sexual anxiety ill at ease
 with its internal "prurient interests," while stout souls like Mailer are
 manifestly cocksure. Like the Supreme Court, the apologists for por-
 nography conceive their mission in relation to a male public; the
 clamor of the debate, a debate which we now see is intimately related
 to male sexuality, takes place around a silent central hole. Female sex-
 uality is that hole. The entire male debate depends upon that silent
 sexuality; those speechless dirty pictures are, quite literally, the hole in
 the male argument.
 Male sexuality's need for this enforced silence has, indeed, been the
 focus of much feminist critique of pornography.22 This would seem to
 be the place for another of the promised feminist revisions: like the
 Minneapolis ordinance, the feminist critique could re-emphasize the
 22. See, for example, Susan Griffin, Pornography and Silence (New York: Harper and
 Row, 1981) and Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women (New York:
 Perigree Books, 1979).
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 consequences of pornography as practice. Perhaps a feminist cultural
 critique could even make female sexuality speak more openly than the
 Minneapolis ordinance. I would like, however, to pursue a different
 tack. Mailer's rhetoric glaringly reveals the figures of male sexuality
 which underlie the male debate over sexually explicit material. His
 language suggests that the real debate may not be political, legal, or re-
 ligious at all, but that the real battlefield may be the psyche. We can ex-
 pect by now that the psyche considered will be male. And yet, in pur-
 suing the attempts to understand pornography as a psychic phe-
 nomenon, we may reach fundamental ground, and a place from which
 female sexuality can speak too.
 "In discussing censorship, it is impossible to make good sense and
 good law without sociological psychological analysis." So writes Paul
 Goodman in his influential essay of 1961, "Pornography, Art and
 Censorship."23 Goodman's essay is one of the more subtle attempts to
 treat pornography and censorship as expressions of a collective socie-
 tal psyche: it is in this sense that his analysis is simultaneously "socio-
 logical" and "psychological." Goodman's central question is "what if
 censorship itself, part of a general repressive antisexuality, causes the
 evil, creates the need for a sadistic pornography sold at a criminal prof-
 it?" (43). Goodman understands that there are psychic motives behind
 social legislation, but he sees only half of the process, which is not
 causative but dialectical. He understands that "censoring is a dynamic
 and emotional act," but then says: "The social question is not the
 freedom of a venal purveyor, though the case is always argued in his
 terms since he is the one brought to court; the question is whether the
 sexual climate of the community is being perverted by the censorship"
 (42). Like the Minneapolis ordinance, Goodman realizes that the "so-
 cial problem" is not limited to questions of free speech, but is the re-
 sult of a certain social practice. This practice, however, makes all the
 difference: where the Minneapolis ordinance would place "pornogra-
 phy" Goodman places "censorship."
 In the end, Goodman fails in precisely what he sets out to do, name-
 ly, to fuse sociological and psychological analyses. Speaking of sado-
 masochistic pornography, that which "combines lust and punishment,
 23. Paul Goodman, "Pornography, Art and Censorship," in Perspectives on Pornogra-
 phy, ed. Douglas A. Hughes (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970), 43.
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 torture and humiliation," Goodman writes: "For the consumer, such
 fantasies have a dual advantage: they satisfy both the need for right-
 eousness (sadistic superego) and the 'weakness' of giving in to pleas-
 ure; they embody an exciting conflict" (56). As far as it goes, this seems
 an accurate appraisal of the psychology of sado-masochistic fantasies.
 Yet Goodman misses the sociological validity of his analysis: "But the
 bother with such images when used privately as pornography is that
 they are socially disapproved and enhance individual guilt; the excite-
 ment proceeds against strong resistance, and mounting fear, and often
 dies; and there is a tendency to raise the ante" (56-57). It is hard to see
 how, if the "excitement often dies," there is also a "tendency to raise
 the ante." Raising the ante precisely is the excitement, the assurance
 that the game will continue. Goodman's individual consumer delights
 in the "exciting conflict" between righteousness and weakness; why
 shouldn't general "social disapproval" (in the form of censorship laws)
 act as the "sadistic superego" just as well as whatever figure of right-
 eousness appears in the pornographic fantasies themselves? Good-
 man's psychological understanding of the dialectic of lust and punish-
 ment fails him at the sociological level, where it is in fact replayed by
 the good guys (the courts) and the bad guys (the pornographers); the
 consumer finds himself in the middle of an "exciting conflict." It is in
 this way that pornography extends its sway throughout mainstream so-
 ciety: through the repetition not of the pornographic content, but of
 pornography's form: the exciting conflict. This repetition marks the
 passage from pornography as practice to pornography as discourse.
 Underlying Goodman's analysis of pornography and censorship is a
 half-hearted Freudianism: his attack on repressive morality (in legisla-
 tion or religious dogma) is one of the clearest examples of what has
 come to be known as the "cathartic theory," the idea that pornography
 serves as a release for various sexual anxieties and drives (male drives,
 to be sure, though Goodman does not mention this). I quote the fol-
 lowing passage to demonstrate the curious obfuscations his argument
 entails:
 The fact is that our generations are living through a general break-
 down of repressive defenses, increasingly accelerated; and there-
 fore a deepening social neurosis. Freud's doctrine, let us remem-
 ber, is that it is not repression (total amnesia) that causes neurosis,
 but the failure of repression, so that the repressed contents return
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 in distorted guise. The process is irreversible; our culture has ex-
 perienced too much of it to ban it, or frighten it, out of mind.
 Therefore, the only recourse is to try to get, as methodically as
 possible, to the end of it, so that the drives can reappear as them-
 selves and come to their own equilibrium. This involves undoing
 the repressive attitude itself. (47-48)
 What is odd about this passage is that it first indicts repression for not
 doing a good enough job, and then calls for the "undoing" of the "re-
 pressive attitude itself." But what, exactly, does Goodman suggest is be-
 ing repressed? All we hear is that "our culture has experienced too much
 of it," we cannot "ban it" or "frighten it," we must merely try to get to
 the "end of it." What is "it"? Pornography? (You can't really "frighten"
 pornography). Repression? Sex? (Can one come to the end of sex?) "It"
 just is, and you can't know "it" till you see "it." Goodman's analysis per-
 forms the very failed repression it criticizes, for, while we do not really
 know "it," it is hard to believe that there is no "it."
 Let us assume, for the moment, that this unspoken entity, this "it,"
 is exactly what has never yet been faced squarely in this debate, nor yet
 in this paper: sexuality. What remains unclear about this sexuality is
 whether "it" is male or female, or whether "it" is the relation between
 the two. Susan Griffin, criticizing the "cathartic theory," captures the
 double-edged nature of arguments like Goodman's:
 Underneath the argument that pornography is cathartic ... is a
 terrible nostalgia and a grief from the imagined loss of this primal
 violence. And so the double message. The speaker who utters op-
 posite truths out of each side of his mouth. TheJanus head. Gemi-
 ni. I do not believe what this head is saying to me. In the first
 place, the head is severed. And it is not Salome who holds it up for
 admiration. The head has detached itself from the body and blames
 the body for its own beastliness.24
 Goodman, who just wants to get to the "end of it," but yet cannot
 bring himself to name "it," would seem to be Griffin's speaker who
 "utters opposite truths out of each side of his mouth." Griffin sees this
 24. Griffin, "Sadism and Catharsis: The Treatment Is the Disease," in Take Back the
 Night: Women on Pornography, ed. Laura Lederer (New York: William Morrow and Co.,
 1980), 143.
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 double message as the mark of an interior conflict ("the twin love of vi-
 olence and fear of violence" [143]) that has been falsely exteriorized:
 what is purely internal to the intellect is seen as a mind-body conflict
 by the mind bent on preserving the conflict. It is this will to maintain
 the conflict that lies at the heart of the male debate over pornography.
 It is what makes all the putative rivals come to resemble each other, so
 that Jerry Falwell and Larry Flynt appear as mirror images, Gemini.
 There is a suggestive power in Griffin's language unmatched by any
 of the male critics considered thus far. The mixture of fascination and
 fear, what Griffin suggests lies at the heart of the pornography contro-
 versy, is itself evoked in the violence of her central image: the severed
 head blaming the body for its own beasdiness. The image is a distilla-
 tion of an entire network of sexually symbolic motives centering on the
 fear of castration. Salome is mentioned, but it is Medusa's head which
 underlies the image. It is a measure of Griffin's acumen, however, that
 Medusa is nowhere to be found: the castration scenario is an exclusive-
 ly male drama. Perhaps pornography's incessant display of female
 genitals, like the myth of Perseus and Medusa, is nothing more than a
 pretext for the continued generation of this drama. Perhaps, as Griffin
 suggests, Perseus castrates himself so that the ultimate fetish object,
 that terrifying talking head, can chatter on, continually re-making its
 fetishized discourse.
 Goodman's account of the cathartic theory, and Griffin's critique of
 it, seem to have propelled us into what comes to look more and more
 like a psychoanalytic vocabulary. I would like now to turn to the psy-
 choanalysts themselves in order to discover what such terms as castra-
 tion and fetishism might mean in relation to the pornography contro-
 versy, as well as what significance such concepts might have for the
 problem of representation that we have run up against in every effort
 to talk about pornography- the problem, that is, of the limits of dis-
 course.
 3. The Psychoanalytic Fetish
 It is always in relation to the question of representation, to the way
 in which the subject is constructed by and in language, that psycho-
 analysis, or at least the strain of psychoanalytic speculation that I will
 be considering here, orders its inquiry. In the second series of lectures
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 included in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Jacques Lacan
 approaches this problem in terms peculiarly appropriate to the inter-
 ests of this essay, for it is in those lectures that he focuses on the func-
 tion of the scopic drive (the pleasure in looking) in the register of de-
 sire. Lacan attempts to understand this drive by asking, "Must we not
 distinguish between the function of the eye and that of the gaze?"25
 The force of this distinction lies in the fact that what is seen by the eye
 is not, for Lacan, simply out there, but must first be constituted as
 something seeable: there is a "pre-existence to the seen of a given-to-
 be-seen" (74). This pre-existent, that which gives to be seen, Lacan
 calls the gaze, "which always escapes from that form of vision that is
 satisfied with itself in imagining itself as consciousness" (74). The gaze,
 then, is constitutive of "that form of vision" which is the function of
 the eye, namely consciousness; and like the unconscious, which consti-
 tutes the basis and reserve from which consciousness arises, the gaze
 always remains just out of sight.
 Lacan is explicit about the connection between the "given-to-be-
 seen" and consciousness: we are not simply conscious beings who di-
 rect our eye to various objects; we are first of all "beings who are
 looked at, in the spectacle of the world. That which makes us consciousness
 institutes us by the same token as speculum mundi" (75, my emphasis).
 In this way, the split between the eye and the gaze would seem to in-
 troduce a wild reciprocity into the scopic field itself, wherein "The
 spectacle of the world ... appears to us as all-seeing" (75). As it hap-
 pens, however, this speculum mundi in which all that is seen is simulta-
 neously "all-seeing" does not necessarily mark the presence (or inter-
 vention) of the gaze. Lacan makes that intervention depend upon a
 certain form of exhibitionism: "The world is all-seeing, but it is not
 exhibitionistic-it does not provoke our gaze. When it begins to pro-
 voke it, the feeling of strangeness begins too" (75). This provocation is
 fundamentally an unconscious operation, since in consciousness, "in
 the so-called waking state, there is an elision of the gaze, and an elision
 of the fact that not only does it look, it also shows. In the field of the
 dream, on the other hand what characterizes the images is the it shows"
 (75).
 We are back, once again, to "it" and, I suspect, in the field of sexuality's
 25. Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain
 Miller, tr. Alan Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 74.
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 relation to representation. Lacan's dream-images mark the interven-
 tion of the gaze by their exhibitionistic intensity-and in this way, they
 come to resemble pornography, which would above all like us to be-
 lieve that "it shows":
 It shows-but here, too, some form of sliding away of the subject
 is apparent. Look up some description of a dream, any one-...
 place it in its co-ordinates, and you will see that this it shows is well
 to the fore. So much is it to the fore, with the characteristics in
 which it is co-ordinated-namely, the absence of horizon, the en-
 closure, of that which is contemplated in the waking state, and,
 also, the character of emergence, of contrast, of stain, of its im-
 ages, the intensification of their colours-that, in the final resort,
 our position in the dream is profoundly that of someone who
 does not see. The subject does not see where it is leading, he fol-
 lows. (75)
 Whatever the nature of these dream images that show, Lacan's dream-
 experience seems, at times, distinctly like a pornographic experience:
 the lack of a sense of containment or "enclosure" so that the entire
 field of concentration is centered on the image; the lurid "intensi-
 fication" of the images themselves; the profound encounter with "con-
 trast" and the sense of a spreading "stain" or guilt; and most impor-
 tantly, the absolute coercion of the subject: "he does not see where it is
 leading, he follows." In his next lecture, entitled "Anamorphosis,"
 Lacan discusses the intervention of the gaze in terms even more remi-
 niscent of the pornographic experience. He refers us to Sartre's fa-
 mous discussion in Being and Nothingness, where, as Lacan notes,
 far from speaking of the emergence of this gaze as of something
 that concerns the organ of sight, [Sartre] refers to the sound of
 rustling leaves,... to a footstep heard in a corridor. And when are
 these sounds heard? At the moment when he has presented him-
 self in the action of looking through a keyhole. A gaze surprises
 him in the function of voyeur .... Is it not clear that the gaze in-
 tervenes here only in as much as it is not the annihilating subject,
 correlative of the world of objectivity, who feels himself surprised,
 but the subject sustaining himself in a function of desire? (84-85)
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 Given such examples of the intervention of the gaze which gives to be
 seen, which shows, it is perhaps not very surprising that Lacan connects
 such an intervention with a feminine operation: "At the very level of
 the phenomenal experience of contemplation, this all-seeing aspect is
 to be found in the satisfaction of a woman who knows that she is being
 looked at, on condition that one does not show her that one knows
 that she knows" (75).
 In this last sentence, Lacan does little more than describe the classic
 pornographic contract: the woman gives herself to be looked at, pro-
 vided the look is anonymous or furtive. Her satisfaction derives not from
 direct sight, but from the privileged displacement of the gaze, from the
 place of the Other: she watches the pleasure of others watching her,
 who by contract, do not acknowledge her vision of their pleasure.
 Lacan's emphasis in this structure is on the woman's "satisfaction"
 and her prior seeing. The remarkable thing in pornographic images
 would be, for Lacan, not what female genitalia look like, but the way
 they look. As he remarks cryptically to his audience: "You no doubt eat
 oysters, innocently enough, without knowing that at this level in the
 animal kingdom the eye has already appeared" (91). For the furtive
 consumer of pornography, not only do the walls have eyes, the images
 being consumed (huitre, oyster, is French slang for vagina) are looking
 at him themselves.26
 Lacan's emphasis on the woman's "satisfaction" in giving herself to
 be seen is not at all unusual; indeed, the pornographers themselves
 have made the depiction (or simulation) of female pleasure one of
 their central concerns, quite without the help of Lacan. John Ellis has
 discussed the pornographic portrayal of women's sexual pleasure as
 just another fetish in the "fetishistic regime" of pornography: "Besides
 the massive diffusion of vaginal imagery ... (imagery often described
 as explicit or aggressive), there also appears a concentration on lesbian
 activities . . . and upon female masturbation, where it is often implied
 strongly by various poses."27 Ellis suggests that female self-pleasuring
 functions just like any other fetish object, i.e., as a disavowal of the fact
 26. Once one makes the connection between Lacan's notion of the gaze and its pe-
 culiar connection to a feminine identity, it is difficult to avoid a certain pornographic
 understanding of a sentence like the following in which Lacan describes "the gaze as
 such, in its pulsatile, dazzling and spread out function" (89).
 27. John Ellis, "Photography/Pornography/Art/Pornography," Screen 21, no. 1
 (Spring 1980): 102.
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 of castration. Following Lacan's revision of Freud, Ellis understands
 castration as loss of the phallus, and not of any real organ, like the pe-
 nis.28 As is often the case, this distinction is extremely hard to main-
 tain. Ellis claims that, even in scenes of female masturbation or les-
 bianism, the phallus is posited as the necessary item: "the fetishistic re-
 gime is maintained by the re-assertion of the phallus as the possession
 of the male, and the female as dependent on the phallus as access to
 pleasure. The male spectator is sutured into the representation as the
 possessor of the pre-requisite; and thus confirmed in a particular psy-
 cho-social construction of self' (105). But the phallus belongs to no
 one, as Lacan makes clear; evidently the "pre-requisite" possessed by
 the male is what he has and the woman doesn't, namely the penis. In
 the passage above, it is difficult to tell who is more deluded: the male
 spectator convinced that he has the phallus, or Ellis himself, who
 thinks the male spectator thinks he has the phallus and not the penis.29
 Freud, in his short essay on fetishism, is less obfuscatory: "The nor-
 mal prototype of all fetishes is the penis of the man, just as the normal
 prototype of an organ felt to be inferior is the real little penis of the wom-
 an, the clitoris."30 According to Freud, objects become fetishes when "in-
 terest is held up at a certain point-what is possibly the last impression
 received before the uncanny traumatic one is preserved as a fetish" (217).
 Thus the foot or shoe are common fetishes due to the "circumstance
 that the inquisitive boy used to peer up the woman's legs toward her
 genitals" (217). As so often with Freud, the scenario is narrativized: the
 little boy looks up the woman's dress, only to find ... nothing! So the
 "last impression received" becomes the fetish, because "interest is held
 up at a certain point." Whose interest? Surely not the little boy's: his in-
 terest was dearly piqued, and he went all the way-he would not need a
 fetish object to deny the woman's castration if he had stopped at the
 shoe.
 It is, I think, Freud's "interest" that is "held up at a certain point."
 28. Ellis, in fact, borrows his terminology almost directly from Lacan's discussion of
 the gaze, which is why he can say "the woman's gaze is where her phallus is located"
 (101).
 29. For a good exposition of the difficulty of keeping the two terms apart, seeJane Gal-
 lop, The Daughter's Seduction: Feminism and Psychoanalysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
 1982), 94 ff.
 30. Sigmund Freud, "Fetishism," in Sexuality and the Psychology of Love, ed. Philip Rieff
 (New York: Collier Books, 1963), 219.
This content downloaded from 129.79.32.58 on Mon, 27 Jan 2020 20:54:39 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Exciting Conflict 69
 Freud's little narrative of investigation and revelation is rather thrilling.
 So thrilling, in fact, that he repeats it for the reader in his own analysis.
 I quote the text in full to preserve the suspense:
 In all cases the meaning and purpose of the fetish turned out
 under analysis to be the same. It revealed itself so unequivocally
 and seemed to me so categorical that I should expect the same
 solution in all cases of fetishism. When I now disclose that the
 fetish is a penis-substitute, I shall certainly arouse disappointment;
 so I hasten to add that it is not a substitute for any chance penis,
 but for a particular quite special penis that had been extremely
 important in early childhood but was afterwards lost. That is to
 say: it should have been given up, but the purpose of the fetish
 precisely is to preserve it from being lost. To put it plainly: the fe-
 tish is a substitute for the woman's (mother's) phallus which the
 little boy once believed in and does not wish to forgo-we know
 why. (214-15)
 Freud's language is almost flirtatiously coy here. He has seen what
 there is to see-"it revealed itself' to him "unequivocally"-and he
 will now reveal the same to us with a flourish: "When I now disclose"
 ... what? A "penis-substitute!" We are "disappointed," yet "aroused"
 by that very disappointment. But there is more excitement still, for this
 fetish is not a substitute for "any chance penis" (whatever that is), but
 for (here the redundancy is crucial) a "particular quite special penis"-
 the mother's. Just when Freud had us looking up mother's dress, his
 "interest" is "held up," and we get, as so many times before, the same
 old penis, to which everything, no matter how exciting, always returns.
 Freud is certain of his audience-"we know why." As Ellis writes of the
 pornographic experience: "all that can be shown in a film or a photo-
 graph is the conditions of pleasure, its circumstances and outward
 manifestations ... all that the viewer finds as the reply to the question
 are the outward displays, what is expected" (105). The penis (or the phal-
 lus, if you are a Lacanian) is, we are constantly reassured, the "condi-
 tions of pleasure"-in bed as in theory. We know why.
 Lacan, even more than Freud, plays hide-and-seek with his reader,
 delays pleasure through the extended foreplay of his theory. Neverthe-
 less, we eventually gain satisfaction, "what is expected." Picking up Lacan's
 discussion of the gaze where we left off, we are assured of the exclusive
This content downloaded from 129.79.32.58 on Mon, 27 Jan 2020 20:54:39 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 70 Jonathan Elmer
 dependence of the gaze on the key terms of his theory-the phallus
 and castration: "The gaze is presented to us only in the form of a
 strange contingency, symbolic of what we find on the horizon, as the
 thrust of our experience, namely, the lack that constitutes castration
 anxiety" (Lacan, 72-73).
 I am suggesting that the term penis and all the terms clustered
 around it "by a strange contingency"-phallus, lack, castration-are
 themselves highly charged objects for psychoanalysis, are in fact in-
 vested as what might be called discursive fetish objects. We find here
 again the transformation of a certain anxiety by means of the elabora-
 tion of a discourse ever more exclusive of the source of that anxiety. It
 is possible to see this elaboration at work in Lacan's discussion of the
 gaze. At one point, Lacan suggests that his interest in the scopic drive,
 marked by the split between the eye and the gaze, is born of the partic-
 ular problems it raises for psychoanalytic theory, marked by the mas-
 ter term of castration: "Indeed, it is this [scopic] drive that most com-
 pletely eludes the term castration" (78). This is perhaps because "of all
 the objects in which the subject may recognize his dependence in the
 register of desire, the gaze is specified as unapprehensible" (83); the
 gaze, in other words, cannot be represented, and thus presents a break
 in the closure of Lacanian theory. Such a break, or split, may explain
 the interest Lacan takes in the issue, but this interest is itself displaced
 by Lacan onto the subject himself: "I propose that the interest the sub-
 ject takes in his own split is bound up with that which determines it-
 namely, a privileged object, which has emerged ... from some self-
 mutilation induced by the very approach of the real, whose name, in
 our algebra, is the objet a" (83). One can almost hear the sense of relief,
 of reasserted mastery, in those final words: "whose name, in our alge-
 bra, is the objet a."
 The point I would make is that "the privileged object" is privileged
 as much by Lacan and the exigencies of his theory as it is by any psy-
 choanalytic subject and that the object is whatever term (here objet a)
 comes to replace, and cover over, the blank space left in the "algebra"
 by the unrepresentable concept (here the gaze). Lacan is quite clear
 about the sort of satisfaction such an exercise entails: "what specifies
 the scopic field and engenders the satisfaction proper to it is that fact
 that ... the fall of the subject always remains unperceived.... In so far
 as the gaze, qua object a, may come to symbolize this central lack
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 expressed in the phenomenon of castration ... it leaves the subject in
 ignorance as to what there is beyond the appearance ..." (76-77). One
 would like to be more precise: such a symbolization of the "unappre-
 hensible" leaves the subject in ignorance as to the possibility that there
 is anything "beyond the appearance." Evidently, the scopic drive, and
 the gaze with which it is split, do not, after all, "elude the term castra-
 tion." It is in order to provide such satisfaction that the terms of the
 discourse themselves become fetishized so that the discourse can con-
 tinually replay the anxiety and the subsequent reassurance provided
 by its mastery.
 The Lacanian text offers at once the illusion of an openended po-
 etic play, and the comforting reassurance that that "play" is, in
 fact, rigidly controlled. The rhetoric of the text itself... offers the
 vicarious thrill of solving problems to which the answers-howev-
 er difficult to find-have always been carefully pre-arranged. But
 the seductive power of the Lacanian text does not lie in the self-
 gratifying pleasure of deciphering its all too obviously calculated
 hermetic style. It lies, rather... in the metaphysical security which
 the text provides in the guise of an objective, "clinically proven"
 scientific truth: in its appeal, beyond the pleasure principle, to that
 desire for ontological certainty which manifests itself in the faith
 that man's fate, however grim, is once and for all decided.31
 The account Maria Ruegg offers here of the "seductive power" of the
 Lacanian text suggests the way in which the allure of an "openended"
 discursive adventure is in fact first simulated and then replaced by its
 negation-by the mastery displayed in overcoming the risk of open-
 endedness and the satisfaction that "ontological certainty" provides.
 This kind of mastery and satisfaction is effected through recourse to a
 privileged term (or set of terms) which seals off the specific discourse in
 question, granting a sort of closure and "ontological certainty." Like
 the Supreme Court with the "average person" and "community stand-
 ards," the porographers with "liberation" and "free speech," or Paul
 Goodman with just "it," psychoanalysis has privileged terms-the phal-
 lus, lack, castration. Once these terms are brandished, they becomes
 fetishized-both a source of anxiety (by their contingency to what they
 31. Maria Ruegg, "Metaphor and Metonymy: The Logic of Structuralist Rhetoric,"
 in Glyph 6 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 154.
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 cover) and a source of reassurance (as the completing terms in a dis-
 course which can now generate itself). Freud came close to the source
 of this anxiety-only to put the penis there instead. Like Griffin's "sev-
 ered head," psychoanalysis ceaselessly castrates itself so that it can fill
 the hole in its discourse. Psychoanalysis aims to know it before it has a
 chance to see it.
 "To the extent that it does not know repression, femininity is the
 downfall of interpretation."32 So writes Michele Montrelay, and so it
 would appear. The long list of figures in the pornography controver-
 sy-the courts, the critics, and psychoanalysts-all fail to represent
 femininity. Pornography itself is the constant and desperate illusion of
 representing femininity. It all fails-everything represented comes, in
 the end, to represent masculinity. It is at this point, when the circles of
 male discourse seem to have completed their closure, to have become
 perfect mirrors of male desire and defense, that one could hope for
 what I have called a feminist revision, that is, an account of the relation
 between sexuality and representation that starts from the differential
 quality that relation has for men and for women. Michele Montrelay's
 "Inquiry into Femininity" is such an account.
 Montrelay begins with a recapitulation of the psychoanalytic debates
 of the 30s on the nature of female sexuality, often referred to as the
 Freud-Jones controversy. Briefly, while Freud insisted on a single libidi-
 nal economy, "always male in essence," Jones and his supporters de-
 fended the notion that "feminine libido is specific": Montrelay calls the
 first position "phallocentric" (since for Freud, "in every case, a particular
 form of relation to the paternal phallus can be traced") and the second
 "concentric" (sinceJones et al. stressed that feminine libido had a partic-
 ular relation to the interior of the body and was marked by the
 "intrication of archaic, oral, anal and vaginal schemas") (83-85). Montre-
 lay does not choose between these two schools of thought; rather, she
 sees the very contradiction "as a play of forces which structures the femi-
 nine unconscious itself' (86). This contradiction, constitutive of the femi-
 nine unconscious, always plays itself out in relation to representation.
 Desire, for Montrelay, is never innate, but is rather the result of
 representation. In phallocentrism, representation is always in relation
 32. Michele Montrelay, "Inquiry into Femininity," tr. Parveen Adams, m/f, no. 1
 (1978): 89.
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 to the phallus, i.e., it is a representation of castration. This all-impor-
 tant representation is made possible only by the repression of whatever
 appears as unrepresentable. In other words, the representation of cas-
 tration simultaneously represses and maintains the child's relation to
 the unrepresentable and thus propels the child into the world of dis-
 course, wherein desire can arise: in this "relation to the paternal phal-
 lus ... it is always a question of maintaining an inaccessible term, so
 that desire can subsist" (85). It was this simultaneous maintenance and
 exclusion of an inaccessible term that was at work in Lacan's discus-
 sion of the gaze: the gaze, "unapprehensible," and connected, more-
 over, to a certain feminine identity, must be both maintained, as what
 lies outside the Lacanian algebra, and repressed, by becoming a sym-
 bolization of castration, the objet a.
 Montrelay allows us to see both the anxiety and the satisfaction in
 this operation of phallocentric representation. The anxiety arises from
 a confrontation with the limits of discourse itself, the unrepresentable:
 "anxiety appears as the limit-moment when conscious and uncon-
 scious representation are blocked off" (87); the satisfaction results from
 the repression of that limit-moment, that is to say, its representation.
 Moreover, for a phallocentric psychoanalysis (Freud, Lacan, etc.) the
 satisfying representation will always be one of castration, specifically,
 the (symbolic) castration of the phallic mother: "At bottom, it is fear of
 the feminine body as a non-repressed and unrepresentable object. In
 other words, . . . femininity experienced as real and immediate, is the
 blind spot of the symbolic processes analysed by Freud" (92). The fe-
 male body presents the threat of the unrepresentable precisely because
 it cannot be castrated, and hence cannot be represented as such: "Thus
 the sex, the vagino-oral organ of the woman, acts as obstacle to castra-
 tion, falsely representing the latter in its effects of allurement which
 provoke anxiety" (93). It is in this sense that we can speak of psychoa-
 nalysis "castrating itself so that it can plug up the hole in its discourse":
 "By verbally putting into place a representation of castration, the ana-
 lyst's word makes sexuality pass into discourse. This type of discourse
 therefore represses, at least in the sense given to the word here [i.e., as a
 representation that both maintains and excludes the unrepresentable
 object, the female body] .... We can ask whether psychoanalysis was
 not articulated precisely in order to repress femininity (in the sense of
 producing its symbolic representation)" (96). We might also ask whether
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 the connection between pornography and the pornography contro-
 versy lies precisely in this shared goal of the repression of femininity
 and its concomitant "symbolic representation."
 Montrelay's analysis of the phallocentric system of repression/repre-
 sentation also allows us to see how its unconscious effects lead to a
 cathexis not of the represented object (which is, after all, unrepre-
 sentable), but of the representation itself, the signifier: "Such a repre-
 sentation takes on an unconscious status at the moment which it no
 longer refers to anything but the words which constitute it. Taken out
 of reality, it no longer refers to anything other than its form: what is
 now cathected ... is [the] specific articulation . .." (87). These specific
 articulations are what I have called fetishized discursive terms (phallus,
 castration, objet a, etc.-"it") which seem inevitably to reappear at those
 anxious, exciting, satisfying moments in the pornography controversy,
 and whose reiteration and substitution promotes and assures the
 replication of the controversy itself: "For the sequence of discourse hav-
 ing once marked us, endlessly reproduces itself. And we can define the
 unconscious as the place where these re-presentations are indefinitely
 staged" (88).33
 33. It seems important, at this point, at least to acknowledge the fact that the term
 fetishism, on which I have been relying so heavily, has resonances in another vo-
 cabulary not considered in this essay, namely that of materialist critique deriving from
 Marx's analysis of commodity fetishism in the first volume of Capital. Alan Soble has
 attempted to take up the question of commodity fetishism in relation to pornography,
 with some convincing results, but he is also forced to stretch the meaning and mecha-
 nism of such fetishism, as Marx defined it, in order to account for some of the ideolog-
 ical processes I have been concerned with in this essay. Thus, he can write: "The Vic-
 torian element and the liberal element are battling each other for social power. They
 are competitors in the business of selling another commodity-judgment-norms-
 and consumers are in the unenviable position of having to decide which corporation
 offers the best buy" (Soble, Pornography: Marxism, Feminism, and the Future of Sexuality, 76).
 In addition to the fact that I disagree with Soble's analysis-insofar as I argue, in my
 discussion of Paul Goodman, that the competition between "judgment-norms" is pre-
 cisely what everyone desires, as it embodies the exciting conflict-I would also note
 that Soble does not adequately explain how it is that "judgment-norms" can come to
 be "commodities," or invested as such. Heterodox Marxist Jean Baudrillard has ar-
 gued that it is precisely traditional Marxism's inability to account for such a direct in-
 vestment (or fetishization) of an ideology that indicates the need to revise Marx's anal-
 ysis. His revision runs as follows: "If fetishism exists it is thus not a fetishism of the
 signified, a fetishism of substances and values ... which the fetish object would incar-
 nate for the alienated subject... it is a fetishism of the signifier. That is to say that the
 subject is trapped in the factitious, differential, encoded, systematized aspect of the ob-
 ject. It is not the passion . . . for substances that speaks in fetishism, it is the passion
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 Montrelay's analysis of sexuality and representation presents us with
 a very powerful account of the phallocentric unconscious in which is
 inscribed the pornography controversy, as we have described it. But a
 final revision is necessary, for if phallocentrism depends upon, and is
 structured by, this operation of repression/representation, such an
 operation can be at most only half the story for women who, according
 to Montrelay, find themselves split by the contradiction constitutive of
 the feminine unconscious, the contradiction between phallocentrism
 and concentricity. This contradiction appears most forcefully as a dis-
 tinction between repression and censorship, for what is repression of
 femininity for the male is censorship for the female. Censorship "is al-
 ways submitted to" while repression "has the value of an act":
 In fact, the obstacles the censor opposes to libidinal development
 appear as the result of the experiences of the Other's desire ....
 From then on, this 'blank,' this unspoken, functions like a check:
 the censor which is set up appears as the effect of an absence of
 representation .... Repression, on the contrary, presupposes a
 symbolization: as we have seen, it allows the representation to be
 cathected as such .... Repression is always a process which struc-
 tures on the level of the psychic economy. (90)
 We can see here the distinction between what men and women get out
 of pornography, both at the level of practice and at the level of dis-
 course. For pornography (and the controversy surrounding it) is simulta-
 neously a symbolization of female sexuality for men and the absence of
 such a representation for women. For women, it is the "experience of
 the Other's desire." And we can see the difference between the Supreme
 for the code. It is the (ambivalent) fascination of a form (logic of the commodity or sys-
 tem of exchange value), a state of absorption, for better or for worse, in the restrictive
 logic of a system of abstraction" (Jean Baudrillard, "Fetishism and Ideology," in For a
 Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, tr. Charles Levin [St. Louis: Telos Press, 1981],
 92). It is exactly this "(ambivalent) fascination for a form" that I have tried to trace in
 this essay by suggesting that the "state of absorption" so common to the pornographic
 experience is replicated in the controversy over pornography itself. The fascination
 with these discourses is ambivalent because, while they ceaselessly try to bring into
 representation, the "restrictive logic" of the discourse depends still on a rule of exclu-
 sion. While I find Baudrillard's analysis of fetishism and ideology suggestive and con-
 vincing (in large measure), I nevertheless remain uncomfortable with what I take to be
 the uneasy alliance struck between a psychoanalytic and Marxist understanding of
 fetishism.
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 Court and the Minneapolis ordinance replayed here as well: the re-
 pression of pornography engaged in by the Supreme Court is, as I
 have tried to show, a "process which structures on the level of the [male]
 psychic economy." On the contrary, the Minneapolis ordinance, by its
 invalidation of a language of female consent, "appears as the result of
 the Other's desire," simultaneously an "effect of an absence of repre-
 sentation" and the assurance that that absence "will always be submit-
 ted to."
 4. Unthinkable Postscript
 The time has come to think about sex .... [It] is precisely at times
 such as these, when we live with the possibility of unthinkable de-
 struction, that people are likely to become dangerously crazy
 about sexuality.
 -Gayle Rubin, Pleasure and Danger
 Yet today we are faced with the greatest challenge of all! Unless we
 can blunt this trend toward the sexual debasement of our very
 own children, then nothing else of value will remain in our belov-
 ed country. Join with me now. There is simply no thinkable alter-
 native.
 -Charles Keating, Jr.,
 Propaganda flyer for the Citizens for Decency through Law
 ... if the representation then does not cease to represent itself,
 how can it disappear? Yet the analyst must reckon with this efface-
 ment, for the patient, who expresses anxiety after the event, is
 speaking of a time when nothing was thinkable.
 -Michele Montrelay, "Inquiry into Femininity"
 As these quotations make clear, questions of representation and sex-
 uality, as they converge in the pornography controversy, evoke a sense
 of urgency or anxiety by their relation to some excluded term: the un-
 thinkable. For Gayle Rubin, it is unthinkable nuclear destruction, for
 Charles Keating pornography itself is unthinkable, and for Montrelay
 it is the possibility that there was ever an "outside" to discourse that
 seems unthinkable. It is Montrelay's limit of the thinkable that this es-
 say has striven to reach; the failure to breach definitively that limit
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 may make it appear that my use of the term "discourse" has remained
 radically unthought. For at every step of the argument, "discourse"
 seems to have gotten there first, setting the terms in such a way as to re-
 peat itself endlessly in the "restrictive logic of a system of abstrac-
 tion."34 Perhaps "discourse" is my own omnipresent, excluded term.
 And yet, as I have tried to do in this essay, the constant task is pre-
 cisely to locate oneself in relation to this unthinkable term-"dis-
 course"-to define as adequately as possible the relations of coercion
 and construction between the subject and his/her limits of representa-
 tion. We are both the patient and the analyst in this process, the patient
 overcome with "anxiety" in his relation to the unthinkable, and the
 analyst who must "reckon with this effacement," the possibility-ne-
 cessity-of an "outside" to the discourse that seems so totally to cir-
 cumscribe her. The answer is not to search for some release from rep-
 resentation. The answer is to try always to find the invested, fetishized
 terms which paper over the anxious holes in discourse itself, and to
 speak from there. This search for a pleasure uncoerced by discourse is
 itself pleasurable, for as Montrelay suggests, "Contrary to what one
 might think, . . . pleasure does not lie in the lifting of an inhibition, ...
 in the releasing of a tension.... On the contrary, pleasure arises from
 the putting in place of new representations .. ." (95).
 34. Jean Baudrillard, "Fetishism and Ideology."
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